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ABSTRACT There is an increasing body of evidence that only a minuscule 
proportion of the sensory data processed by the unconscious mind 
(capable of processing approximately 11 million bits per second) is 
referred to the conscious mind (capable of processing approximately 50 
bits per second). It is also clear that conscious awareness of stimuli from 
the environment lags actual perception by approximately half a second, 
but that a backward referral of subjective experience results in a 
individual’s perception of the stimulus and its conscious awareness as 
simultaneous. These findings challenge the primacy and supremacy of 
conscious processing of information on which a substantial proportion of 
educational practice and policy is based, and suggest a re-evaluation of the 
nature of teacher competence and expertise. 
In search of brain-based education? 
That is the title of an article by John Bruer, who argues that most of what is known about 
the physiology of brains is inadequate to inform teaching and learning (Bruer, 1999). He 
cites the example of brain-lateralization, which has spawned a number of teaching 
approaches that are designed to complement „left-brain‟ and „right-brain‟ approaches to 
learning. However, as he points out, the research that shows that some activities are 
lateralized in one side of the brain or the other deals with highly specialized activities, and 
that all educationally significant activities require both sides of the brain. While some of 
the „prescriptions‟ claiming to emerge from research on brain-lateralization may have 
benefit, Bruer concludes that none are currently grounded in evidence. 
Similar conclusions follow from the research on learning styles. While some studies claim 
to show that changing teaching to cater for individuals‟ learning styles produces 
improvements in learning, other studies have found that forcing learners to learn in a style 
different from their preference can increase learning (Adey, Fairbrother, Wiliam, Johnson, 
& Jones, 1999). The message from the learning styles research is that teaching should cater 
for a range of learning styles—but the same conclusion arises from most other theoretical 
stances on learning too. 
At the risk of adding one more item to the pile of unwarranted extrapolations from 
cognitive science, in this paper I want to explore the consequences of some little-known 
but highly significant research findings that I think have profound implications for the way 
that we think about education in general, and the process of teaching in particular. The 
remainder of this and the next section of this paper draw heavily on a very readable account 
of the nature of consciousness written by Tor Nørretranders (1998). 
There is an increasing body of evidence that only a minuscule proportion of the sensory 
data processed by the unconscious mind is referred to the conscious mind. Table 1 below is 
based on data from Zimmerman (1989) and shows that the bandwidth of consciousness 
processing is far less than the bandwidth of the sensory inputs received generated by the 
body‟s sensory systems. 
Now of course, it could be that most of the vast amount of information received by the 
body‟s sensory systems is simply ignored. In other words that all but the information in 
conscious perception is discarded by the brain, or doesn‟t even arrive at the brain—for 
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example, it could be that sensory data that is not the subject of „attention‟ is not even 
processed. However, several strands of research evidence suggest that this is not so. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
For example, there is a substantial body of evidence that subliminal (literally „below the 
threshold‟) perception (ie perception that is not available to consciousness) can be used in 
conscious processing. It is now well known that stimuli that are perceived for too short a 
period to be consciously perceived (ie subliminal) can, nevertheless, „prime‟ respondents in 
the way that they answer subsequent questions (Kihlstrom, 1987). Further evidence for the 
important of sensations that are not perceived consciously comes from descriptions of 
cases of patients with damage to certain parts of the brain. Many of these patients are, to all 
intents and purposes, blind, in that they are not aware of being able to see anything. Yet, in 
tests of visual perception, they consistently score well above chance levels. This 
„blindsight‟ can only be explained by a level of visual processing that is not available to 
consciousness (Sacks, 1995). 
It is also clear that this filtering process is largely, if not completely, determined by 
previous experience. In the well-known optical illusion shown in figure 1, generally known 
after the German psychologist Franz Carl Müller-Lyer, as the Müller-Lyer illusion the two 
vertical line segments are exactly the same length. However, the left-hand vertical appears 
to be much shorter than the one on the right. The most convincing explanation of this has 
been provided by Richard Gregory who suggests that the illusion is caused by the visual 
processing system‟s interpretation of the left hand figure as an external corner of an object, 
while that on the right is an internal corner (Gregory, 1966). Since the visual perception 
system „knows‟ that objects that are further away are smaller, it compensates for this by 
creating a perception of the internal corner as larger, because it must be further away. As 
Hundert (1995, p.211) observes: 
It is tempting to call this phenomenon of the accommodation of our plastic visual input 
analyzers to the realities of depth perspective and size constancy in our world a “natural 
phenomenon”—except for the simple fact that such rectilinear lines do not exist in 
nature! (emphasis in original) 
And indeed, it has been found that people raised in cultures who do not build rectilinear 
structures do not experience the Müller-Lyer illusion (Deregowsky, 1974). Even something 
as basic as what we see, therefore, is not „transparent‟, but rather is filtered by the 
unconscious processing that takes place prior to referral to consciousness. 
Figure 1 about here 
Evidence that this filtering takes place after unconscious perception is provided by a study 
relating to another well-known optical illusion (known as a size-contrast illusion). The two 
central circles in figure 2 are actually the same size, but the circle on the left appears to be 
bigger, because of the presence of the smaller surrounding circles. However Aglioti, De 
Souza and Goodale (1995) found that when the visual illusion was recreated with three 
dimensional plastic discs, while participants continued to see the circle surrounded by 
small discs as smaller, a videotape of the participants reaching to pick up the central disc 
showed exactly the same finger separation for the two situations. In the words of the title of 
the paper, these size-contrast illusions “deceive the eye but not the hand”, or, in terms of 
the present analysis, visual illusions deceive the conscious, but not the unconscious mind. 
Figure 2 about here 
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Another interesting effect is observed if one holds both one‟s hands in front of one‟s face, 
one hand being held twice as far away from the eyes as the other. The laws of physics tell 
us that the nearer hand should be seen as twice as large (and as having four times the area) 
of the further hand, but for most people, this is not what is observed. 
A final example of the role of unconscious processing in perception is provided by the 
effect of „colour constancy‟ whereby objects do not appear to change colour as the lighting 
conditions vary, or as the object moves to a region where the ambient lighting conditions 
are different. Again, the laws of physics tell us that the actual wavelength of the light 
impacting the retina changes, but this is not perceived as a change in colour. The 
unconscious mind‟s theoretical model—that the object has not changed colour—overrides 
the raw sense data and creates in the conscious mind the phenomenon of colour constancy. 
While our perception of the real world therefore appears as a transparent process, the 
„physical‟ model of sense data being referred to consciousness in a direct and 
unproblematic way simply does not hold up: 
We do not experience the world as raw data. When our consciousness experiences the 
world, the unconscious discarding of sensory information has long since interpreted 
things for us. What we experience has acquired meaning before we become conscious of 
it. (Nørretranders, 1998, p.187, original emphasis) 
It is also important to note that the meaning that is attached to experience includes affective 
content. Traditional models of affect posit that data are processed consciously, and then 
referred for an affective reaction. In other words, first we decide what we think, and then 
we decide how we feel about it. However, the evidence provided by Damasio (1994) 
indicates that the real order of things is likely to be the reverse of this. The unconscious 
processing that occurs prior to referral to consciousness invests the sense data with affect 
before referral to consciousness. In other words, what we feel about something tells us 
what we think. Further elaboration of these ideas is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
interested reader is referred to Damasio‟s work which provides a very readable introduction 
to recent research on affect and reasoning. 
Now all this processing and filtering of sense data prior to referral to consciousness must 
take some time, but when experimenters attempted to work out exactly how long this took, 
the answer was so surprising that many people have found it hard to accept. 
 The half-second delay 
In the 1960s and 1970s, two German neurophysiologists attempted to estimate exactly how 
long it took for a decision to initiate a movement (for example moving a finger) that 
resulted in action. They found that any action such as flexing a finger is presaged by an 
increase in electrical activity (what they termed a readiness potential) that appears to 
correspond to the brain preparing to carry out an action by determining how it is to be 
done. What was surprising was that, on average, the increase in readiness potential began 
0.8 seconds before the finger was flexed. The question that then arises is when is the 
conscious decision to act actually made? The classical answer would be that the conscious 
decision to act must occur at the same time as the onset of the increase in readiness 
potential, but this would suggest that it took over three-quarters of a second for this 
decision to result in action, which doesn‟t accord with either our experience or our 
„common sense‟. However, the alternative is even less plausible, and that is that the 
increase in readiness potential precedes the decision to act. 
 
4 
The matter was settled by a series of very elegant experiments reported by Benjamin Libet 
in 1979 in which participants were asked to flex a finger whenever they felt like doing so. 
In order to answer the question as to the sequence of events, it was necessary to get data on 
three events—when the increase in readiness potential began, when the conscious decision 
was made, and when the finger moved. The first and last of these were easy to obtain. In 
order to get reliable data on when the conscious decision was made, the participants were 
asked to look at a clock face with a single hand which made one revolution every 2.56 
seconds. Asking the participants to note the position of the hand when they decided to flex 
the finger provided a reliable measure of when the decision was taken. 
The results were highly consistent, and showed that the increase in readiness potential 
began 0.55 seconds before the act, but much more surprisingly, the conscious decision 
occurred 0.2 seconds before the act. In other words, the conscious decision to act occurs 
0.35 seconds after the body has started the mechanism to act! 
Although this result is astonishing, and provoked much controversy (see Nørretranders,  
1998, pp. 220-250 for a discussion) Libet‟s interpretation of these events did actually 
explain experimental and other phenomena that had been observed. For example, many 
people have had the sensation of looking at the second-hand of a clock for more than a 
second, and yet the second hand does not appear to move. The delay between experience 
and conscious awareness seems the most likely explanation. 
Libet‟s explanation also explained some experimental results that Arthur Jensen had 
collected in the 1960s. In collecting the reaction times of individuals, which averaged 0.25 
seconds, he suspected that some of the participants were deliberately slowing down their 
reactions (because they distrusted what he would do with the data). Jensen then asked the 
participants to increase their reaction times gradually, but none of the participants could do 
this. As soon as they tried to slow down their reactions at all, the reaction times increased 
to over half a second (reported in Libet, 1981 pp185-186). 
These and many similar experiments show that conscious awareness of stimuli from the 
environment lags actual perception by up to half a second. Information from different parts 
of the body about simultaneous events arrive at the brain at different times, but the brain 
assembles these data so that an individual perceives the stimulus and its conscious 
awareness as simultaneous. Michael Gazzaniga sums it up thus: 
“Major events associated with mental processing go on, measurably so, in our brain 
before we are aware of them. At the same time, these done deals do not leave us feeling 
we are watching only a movie of our life. Because of temporal referral mechanisms, we 
believe we are engaged in effecting these deals.” (Gazzaniga, 1999 pp73-74) 
Educational implications 
Much (if not most) of our current practice in education is based on a simplistic model of 
brain function—one in which data is received in a way very similar to that in which it is 
transmitted, passed directly to consciousness, and of which more or less sense is made. 
This criticism applies just as much to so-called „constructivist‟ views of learning as to 
more traditional models. Recently, there has been recognition that implicit learning 
(learning in which you don‟t know that you‟re learning and you don‟t know what you‟ve 
learnt) is an important element of learning, but much of this research is relatively 
atheoretical, and rarely ventures beyond description. 
The central feature of the argument I want to advance here is that traditional theories of 
learning will not serve, either as descriptions of what does happen, or of prescriptions of 
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what should happen. Acceptance of the significance of the neurophysiological evidence 
outlined above requires a radical reconceptualisation of both learning and teaching. 
Some important work has been done in this regard. Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind by Guy 
Claxton (1997) provides compelling evidence about the centrality of unconscious 
processing in learning, but in the remainder of this paper I want to explore the relevance of 
these experimental findings to two aspects of the activities of teachers: teachers‟ cognitive 
activities in day-to-day teaching, and assessment. 
Teachers’ cognitive activities 
The failure of psychology to impact on the improvement of teaching competence in 
general, and on teacher education specifically has been lamented for many years. In his 
influential book The reflective practitioner, Donald Schön (1983) attributes this to the 
pursuit of a project of technical rationality which he regards as epistemologically 
inappropriate, in that technical rationality seeks to separate theory (based on explicit 
knowledge—knowing that) from practice (often based on implicit knowledge—knowing 
how). Schön argues that competence is achieved not by the reflection on action but by 
reflection in action. However, as Tomlinson (no date) points out, technical rationality may 
also fail because it is inadequate to illuminate practice. As Tomlinson says: 
I think it would be fair to say that when education consulted the psychology cupboard 
some decades ago, it didn‟t find too much of direct relevance to the promoting of 
relatively complex human learning, in pupils of varying ages, in typically complex 
social settings (p. 3). 
Compared with other areas of research in education, the cognitive activity of teachers has 
received relatively little attention. That research does acknowledge that a lesson delivered 
by an experienced teacher consists of a number of „scripts‟ (Schank & Abelson, 1977), 
„frames‟ (Minsky, 1975) or „images‟ that are linked together. However, it is common to 
regard the assembly of these scripts as an „automatic‟ process: 
Much of their instruction is accomplished though previously developed routines that 
minimize the need for conscious decision making and that tend to be played out once 
they are begun. Using these images and routines, teachers proceed on „automatic pilot‟ 
so long as events develop as expected. Their attention is focused on keeping the activity 
moving at a good pace, managing the group, and monitoring the involvement of 
individuals. This is accomplished mostly automatically using routines and heuristics so 
long as pupil response remains within the expected and acceptable levels of tolerance. 
(Bromme & Brophy, 1986, p. 116) 
While this analysis portrays, I think accurately, the lack of conscious decision-making in 
much of teachers‟ day-to-day classroom activities, I want to suggest that regarding the 
teacher‟s „normal‟ activity as one of being on „automatic pilot‟ is unhelpful, and underplays 
the significance of the unconscious cognitive processing that takes place during this 
activity. To illustrate this, let us first consider an aspect of the nature of expertise in playing 
chess. 
Chase and Simon (1973) showed chessboards, on which were placed a number of pieces, to 
an expert, an intermediate and a novice chess player for five seconds, after which they were 
asked to reconstruct what they had seen (this process was repeated several times, with 
different arrangements of pieces). The arrangements on the chessboards were produced in 
two ways. Half of the chessboards were positions from actual games either in the middle of 
a game (with 24 to 26 pieces), or at the end of a game (12 to 15 pieces). The other positions 
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were generated by taking the pieces from one of the actual games and re-arranging them 
randomly. The results are shown in table 2. As can be seen, experts were slightly worse 
than intermediates and novices when the pieces were arranged randomly, but were four 
times better when the pieces were arranged in a pattern from a real game. 
Table 2 about here 
In their discussion of this result, Chase and Simon suggest that the much better 
performance of experts with „real‟ chessboards stems from an ability to „read‟ a chessboard 
in terms of a series of standard configurations of pieces that they have learnt through their 
experience as chess players. 
This is analogous to a much more prosaic task in which we ask someone to memorise a 
seven-letter string. The seven letter string “p•a•n•c•a•k•e” is easier to memorise than 
“a•m•o•e•b•a•e”, which in turn is easier to memorise than “j•k•q•x•z•q•g” because the first 
two can be processed as a whole (ie as a „gestalt‟), although the second probably also 
requires some familiarity with conventions of Latin spelling. The third string can be 
memorised by the conscious construction of a mnemonic, but that is likely to take some 
time.  
From this perspective, expertise is not the result of being able to deploy a small number of 
highly general and abstract strategies but rather the ability to „read‟ a situation in terms of a 
very large number of highly specific configurations—Simon (1980) estimated that a chess 
grandmaster might have a repertoire of as many as 50,000 „chunks‟ of information to 
represent the configuration of pieces on a chessboard. 
Another example of the context-sensitivity of expertise is provided by the mathematical 
activity used in the television programme „Countdown‟. The contestants are given a set of 
numbers, and, by using the four arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, are required to generate an arithmetical expression to the value 
of a given target number. For example, the given numbers might be 20, 11, 2, 5 and 3, with 
a target number of 105. There are many relatively general strategies that can be developed 
for solving problems such as these, but the most interesting feature of such problems for 
the purposes of this paper is that expert performance does not appear to use such general 
strategies. In fact most people use surprisingly specialized strategies that only work with 
the specific constraints and affordances (Gibson, 1979) of this particular problem. A 
typical approach relies on working forwards from the givens and backwards from the goal 
at the same time. It is important to note that this does not appear to be an iterative process, 
but rather, for most people with a reasonable repertoire of number facts, the fact that 5x20 
is 100, which is close to the target number, seems to leap unbidden into consciousness. 
Returning to the case of teaching, the research undertaken by Bennett, Desforges, 
Cockburn and Wilkinson (1984) found that teachers interpreted the information with which 
they were presented in classrooms in the light of their past experiences, and these „filters‟ 
proved relatively difficult to modify. In terms of the arguments presented here, we can 
interpret this as the result of unconscious processing of sense data prior to their referral to 
conscious perception. The relative stability of the teachers‟ filters even in the face of a 
teacher‟s conscious desire to focus on a particular aspect of their behaviour which they 
wish to modify is not surprising because the filter has done its work in advance of the 
referral of sense data to consciousness. Even with the best will in the world, if 
consciousness doesn‟t actually get the data, it is impossible for it to act on them. In other 
words, inexpert teachers were simply unable to „read‟ their classrooms in the same way as 
an expert might. Support for this interpretation comes from the work of David Berliner and 
his colleagues (see, for example, Berliner, Stein, Saberrs, Brown Claridge, Cushing, & 
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Pinnegar, 1989) who found that expert teachers had much richer interpretations of slides 
and videotapes of teaching situations, even though they could not say why they believed 
what they did. Perhaps most interestingly, expert teachers found situations in which actors 
played the roles of students much more disorienting than novice teachers although they 
were unable to articulate why. They appeared to rely on cues and signals that are processed 
unconsciously, but which actors playing the role of students did not reproduce. 
From this it appears that there are no „shortcuts‟ to teaching expertise. Expertise in 
teaching, as in most other areas, requires the development of the facility for unconscious 
processing of richly detailed data, from which the relevant details are abstracted and 
referred to consciousness. Furthermore, the pace of classroom activity means that there is 
literally no time to think (at least consciously). If we are to effect real and lasting 
improvements in teachers‟ competence, we need a much more detailed of understanding of 
how different teachers, exposed to similar experiences develop such different filters in their 
unconscious processing. 
Assessment 
In assessment, there is a considerable debate over the use of analytic versus holistic 
marking schemes (Mabry, 1999; Wiliam, 1996; 1999). Concerns for inter-rater reliability 
have driven educational policy makers to implement assessment systems that attempt to 
define quality in terms of explicit criteria for success. This certainly has the effect of 
increasing the inter-rater reliability of the assessments (although relatively little work has 
been done in estimating the effects on other sorts of reliability). 
However, there is widespread agreement that in many domains, particularly those that 
require creativity, and in the assessment of authentic performance, the imposition of such 
mark-schemes compromises validity. Where there is more than one correct answer, and 
where students can produce solutions not envisaged by the authors of the mark-scheme, 
high-quality responses can frequently be given low scores (Wiliam, 1998). 
In terms of modern validity theory, this would be regarded as a kind of construct under-
representation (Messick, 1989). Only some aspects of quality are represented in the mark-
scheme, and other aspects are ignored. In terms of the arguments of this paper, however, 
we can interpret the mismatch between analytic and holistic scoring as a distinction 
between conscious and unconscious processing. 
It is fairly clear that teachers acquire notions of „standards‟ much more effectively when 
presented with actual samples of students‟ work which exemplify the standards being 
promulgated than when given criterion-based descriptions of the standards. In the light of 
the research evidence presented above, I would like to suggest that the explanation of this 
phenomenon is that the grading of pieces of work with respect to a set of internal standards 
involves a far greater use of unconscious processing than has previously been 
acknowledged. Models that rely on the use of „grade descriptions‟ within consciousness 
have insufficient bandwidth to capture the complexity of the processes involved. 
Ultimately, the perception of quality can never be an entirely conscious process. As Robert 
Pirsig has argued: 
Quality doesn‟t have to be defined. You understand it without definition. Quality is a 
direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual abstractions. (Pirsig, 1991, 
p.64) 
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Again, a recognition and an understanding of the role of unconscious processing will be 
necessary before we can begin to develop teachers‟ ability to assess students‟ work reliably 
and fairly. 
Conclusion 
The education systems of most developed countries are predicated on the assumption that 
the most valuable kind of knowledge is abstract, generalized and transcendent, and this 
assumption has been supported by the findings of mainstream psychology. Hyman Witkin, 
widely credited as the first to distinguish between field-dependence and field-independence 
(Witkin, 1950) has gone so far as to assert that field-independence—the ability to ignore 
contextual effects—is intelligence (Abelson, 1995, 182n). This has led to a search for 
broad general principles of expertise that can be used to „short-cut‟ the learning process.  
Now of course, general intellectual capability does clearly play a role in expertise of all 
kinds, but such capability will not lead to expertise if the right kinds of data are not 
available to conscious processing. The availability of these data requires a thorough 
grounding in experience which it appears is extraordinarily difficult to acquire without 
prolonged immersion in the relevant settings. 
In the context of the research findings presented here the idea of intuition remains 
mysterious, but can be viewed as an exquisite and largely unconscious sensitivity to very 
small details. In the words of Andy Clark (1997), expertise can only be developed by 
„being there‟. 
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Table 1: information flow in sensory systems and conscious perception 
Sensory 
system 
Total bandwidth 
(in bits/second) 
Conscious bandwidth 
(in bits/second) 
Eyes 10,000,000 40 
Ears 100,000 30 
Skin 1,000,000 5 
Taste 1,000 1 
Smell 100,000 1 
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Figure 1: the Müller-Lyer illusion 
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Figure 2: an optical illusion that “deceives the eye but not the hand” 
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Table 2: performance in reconstructing actual and random chessboards 
 
Position Novices Intermediates Experts 
Random 4 3.5 3 
Actual 4 8 16 
 
